AI Prediction Scorecard: Tracking Who Got It Right
A rigorous accounting of public predictions by AI leaders, researchers, and commentators. Who predicted what, when, with what deadline — and whether they were right. Tracking AGI timelines, capability claims, market forecasts, and risk assessments with verifiable outcomes.
Predictions are easy to make and hard to track. The AI industry is saturated with bold claims about timelines, capabilities, and consequences — claims that shape policy, investment, and public perception. Yet remarkably few of these predictions are ever systematically evaluated against reality.
This scorecard changes that. We track specific, verifiable predictions made by AI leaders, researchers, and public intellectuals. We record what was predicted, when it was said, what deadline was given (explicit or implicit), and whether the prediction turned out to be correct. Where predictions remain unresolved, we track them until they can be evaluated.
The goal is not to humiliate people who get things wrong. Prediction is hard, and the honest acknowledgment of uncertainty is a virtue. The goal is to build a public record that distinguishes careful forecasters from habitual hype merchants, and to create accountability for claims that influence billions of dollars in investment and the lives of billions of people.
For related data, see our AI Statistics 2026, AI Doomsday Clock, and AI Safety Complete Guide.
Methodology
Inclusion Criteria
A prediction is included if it meets all of the following:
- Made publicly (interview, publication, social media, testimony)
- Attributable to a specific individual
- Contains a verifiable claim about a future event or state
- Includes an explicit or strongly implied deadline
We do not include vague aspirational statements (“AI will transform everything”), hedged probabilities without specific outcomes, or private communications.
Evaluation Standards
| Status | Criteria |
|---|---|
| Correct | The predicted event or condition has occurred within the specified timeframe |
| Wrong | The deadline has passed and the predicted event has not occurred |
| Partially Correct | Some aspects of the prediction have materialized but key elements have not |
| Pending | The deadline has not yet passed |
| Unfalsifiable | The prediction is too vague to evaluate (noted but not scored) |
Scoring Notes
We evaluate predictions charitably where reasonable. If someone predicted “AGI by 2025” and we are assessing in February 2026, we treat the prediction as wrong — but note if progress toward the predicted outcome was substantial. Conversely, if someone predicted something would not happen and it did, we do not penalize them for cautious underestimates unless the prediction was clearly directionally wrong.
AGI Timeline Predictions
The most consequential predictions in AI are about when — if ever — artificial general intelligence will be achieved. These predictions directly influence investment decisions, regulatory urgency, and public preparedness. See our glossary for the definition of AGI.
| Predictor | Prediction | Date Made | Deadline | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ray Kurzweil | Human-level AI by 2029 | 2005 | 2029 | Pending | Restated consistently for 20 years; Kurzweil defines this as AI passing a valid Turing test |
| Ray Kurzweil | Technological Singularity by 2045 | 2005 | 2045 | Pending | Recursive self-improvement leads to intelligence explosion |
| Elon Musk | AGI by 2025 | Dec 2023 | 2025 | Wrong | Musk defined AGI as “smarter than any single human”; no system achieved this by end of 2025 |
| Elon Musk | AI will be smarter than any single human by end of 2025 | Apr 2024 | End 2025 | Wrong | No system demonstrated comprehensive superiority across all cognitive domains |
| Elon Musk | AGI by 2026, ASI by 2029 | Nov 2024 | 2026/2029 | Pending | Revised from earlier 2025 prediction |
| Sam Altman | AGI could be achieved by 2025 | Nov 2023 | 2025 | Wrong | Altman used equivocal language (“could be”) but the claim shaped market expectations |
| Sam Altman | AGI is “a few thousand days away” | Sep 2024 | ~2032 | Pending | Roughly 8-year timeline from statement |
| Dario Amodei | “Powerful AI” (near-AGI) by 2026-2027 | Oct 2024 | 2027 | Pending | Amodei avoids the term “AGI” but describes comparable capabilities |
| Demis Hassabis | AGI within 5-10 years | 2023 | 2028-2033 | Pending | Hassabis defines AGI conservatively; updated estimate multiple times |
| Demis Hassabis | AI could solve major scientific problems by 2030 | 2024 | 2030 | Pending | Partially validated by AlphaFold; full claim awaits broader demonstration |
| Yann LeCun | Current approaches will not achieve AGI | 2023 | Ongoing | Pending | LeCun argues autoregressive LLMs lack world models; prediction requires alternative approach to succeed or current approach to achieve AGI |
| Yann LeCun | Human-level AI is decades away | 2023 | ~2043+ | Pending | Contrarian position relative to peers |
| Geoffrey Hinton | AGI could happen within 5-20 years | May 2023 | 2028-2043 | Pending | Wide range reflects genuine uncertainty; Hinton revised his timeline dramatically after leaving Google |
| Gary Marcus | LLMs will hit a capability wall without fundamental new approaches | 2022 | Ongoing | Partially Correct | Scaling has continued to produce gains, but diminishing returns on benchmarks and persistent reliability issues support parts of this thesis |
| Ben Goertzel | AGI by 2027 | 2023 | 2027 | Pending | Goertzel (SingularityNET) has a long history of optimistic AGI predictions |
| Shane Legg | 50% probability of AGI by 2028 | 2023 | 2028 | Pending | DeepMind co-founder; one of the earliest quantified AGI predictions |
Capability Predictions
| Predictor | Prediction | Date Made | Deadline | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sam Altman | AI will be able to do “most cognitive jobs” a human can | 2023 | ~2028 | Pending | Implies broad cognitive capability replacement |
| Jensen Huang | AI will pass any human test within 5 years | Mar 2024 | 2029 | Pending | NVIDIA CEO; extremely broad claim |
| Satya Nadella | AI copilots will be standard in every knowledge worker’s workflow | 2023 | 2025 | Partially Correct | Copilots are widely available but adoption is uneven; many workers still do not use them regularly |
| Mark Zuckerberg | Meta will build general intelligence and open-source it | Jan 2024 | Unspecified | Pending | No timeline given; Llama models are open-weight but not AGI |
| Elon Musk | Tesla robotaxis with no steering wheel by 2024 | 2019 | 2024 | Wrong | Tesla launched supervised FSD but not fully autonomous robotaxis |
| Elon Musk | Optimus robot will be available for purchase for $20K-$25K | 2024 | ~2026 | Pending | Prototype demonstrated; no commercial sales |
| Sundar Pichai | AI will be more transformative than fire or electricity | 2023 | Long-term | Unfalsifiable | Cannot be evaluated on any reasonable timeline |
| Ilya Sutskever | LLMs may already be “slightly conscious” | 2022 | N/A | Unfalsifiable | No agreed-upon test for consciousness; included for its influence on discourse |
| Andrej Karpathy | AI will write 80%+ of code within 5 years | 2024 | 2029 | Pending | GitHub Copilot produces ~40-55% of code in some contexts, but full prediction requires much broader adoption |
Market & Industry Predictions
| Predictor | Prediction | Date Made | Deadline | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Goldman Sachs | Generative AI will add $7 trillion to global GDP | Jun 2023 | ~2034 | Pending | 10-year projection; currently on pace for significantly lower impact |
| McKinsey | Generative AI will add $2.6-4.4 trillion annually | Jun 2023 | ~2030 | Pending | Annual value-add; current measurable impact is well below this range |
| IDC | Worldwide AI spending will reach $300B by 2026 | 2024 | 2026 | Pending | Current trajectory supports this; see AI Statistics 2026 |
| Sequoia Capital | AI companies need $600B in annual revenue to justify infrastructure investment | Sep 2024 | ~2027 | Pending | The “AI’s $600B question”; current AI revenue is estimated at $100-150B |
| David Cahn (Sequoia) | AI infrastructure is in a bubble | 2024 | ~2026 | Pending | Comparison to dot-com and telecom bubbles |
| Cathie Wood (ARK) | AI will add $200 trillion to global GDP by 2030 | 2023 | 2030 | Pending | The most extreme market prediction tracked; most analysts consider this implausible |
| Sam Altman | OpenAI will reach $100B in revenue | 2024 | ~2029 | Pending | OpenAI revenue was ~$3.4B in 2024 |
| Various | The AI bubble will burst by 2026 | 2023-2024 | 2026 | Pending | Multiple commentators; AI spending has continued to accelerate through early 2026 |
Risk & Safety Predictions
| Predictor | Prediction | Date Made | Deadline | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Geoffrey Hinton | AI poses an existential threat within decades | May 2023 | ~2043 | Pending | Hinton’s departure from Google to warn about AI risk was a landmark event |
| Yoshua Bengio | Without regulation, AI will cause catastrophic harm | 2023 | ~2030 | Pending | Turing Award winner; increasingly vocal about risk |
| Stuart Russell | Autonomous weapons will be used in conflict within 5 years | 2019 | 2024 | Correct | AI-assisted targeting has been documented in multiple conflicts |
| Gary Marcus | A major AI-caused disaster will occur before AGI | 2023 | Before AGI | Partially Correct | Multiple serious incidents documented (see AI Incident Tracker) though no single “disaster” of the scale Marcus implies |
| Eliezer Yudkowsky | AI alignment is not being solved fast enough; likely doom | 2022 | N/A | Pending | Yudkowsky’s extreme pessimism has been influential but is unfalsifiable without specified timeline |
| Timnit Gebru | AI bias will cause systemic harm to marginalized communities | 2020 | Ongoing | Correct | Extensively documented; see AI Incident Tracker bias category |
| Max Tegmark | Without a pause, AI development will produce uncontrollable systems within 10 years | 2023 | 2033 | Pending | FLI founder; co-authored the 6-month pause letter |
| CAIS Statement signatories | AI poses an extinction-level risk | May 2023 | N/A | Unfalsifiable | One-sentence statement signed by hundreds of researchers; no timeline or specific mechanism |
Regulation & Policy Predictions
| Predictor | Prediction | Date Made | Deadline | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Various EU officials | EU AI Act will be fully enforceable by 2026 | 2023 | Aug 2026 | Pending | On track; prohibited practices provisions active since Feb 2025 |
| Tech industry lobbyists | EU AI Act will drive AI companies out of Europe | 2023 | 2026 | Wrong | No major AI company has left the EU market; compliance costs have been manageable |
| Multiple US lawmakers | Comprehensive federal AI legislation by 2025 | 2023 | 2025 | Wrong | No comprehensive federal AI law was enacted by end of 2025; only sector-specific measures |
| China analysts | China will develop comprehensive AI regulation by 2025 | 2023 | 2025 | Correct | China enacted multiple AI regulations covering deepfakes, generative AI, and algorithmic recommendations |
| INHUMAIN.AI | HUMAIN will deploy without independent safety audit | Oct 2025 | Feb 2026 | Correct | No independent audit has been published; see HUMAIN Tracker |
INHUMAIN.AI Predictions
We believe accountability should apply to us as well. These are our own predictions, with explicit deadlines:
| Prediction | Date Made | Deadline | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| The EU AI Act’s first enforcement fine will exceed EUR 10 million | Feb 2026 | Dec 2026 | Pending |
| HUMAIN will deploy AI systems in Saudi critical infrastructure without publishing a safety assessment | Oct 2025 | Jun 2026 | Pending |
| At least one frontier lab will experience a significant safety researcher exodus (10+ departures) in 2026 | Feb 2026 | Dec 2026 | Pending |
| No binding international AI safety treaty will be signed in 2026 | Feb 2026 | Dec 2026 | Pending |
| AI-generated deepfake content will be used to attempt to influence at least 5 national elections in 2026 | Feb 2026 | Dec 2026 | Pending |
| Total documented AI incidents will exceed 1,200 by end of 2026 | Feb 2026 | Dec 2026 | Pending |
| US federal AI legislation will remain patchwork and sector-specific through 2026 | Feb 2026 | Dec 2026 | Pending |
| AGI (by any rigorous definition) will not be achieved in 2026 | Feb 2026 | Dec 2026 | Pending |
| AI safety funding will remain below 2% of total AI investment through 2026 | Feb 2026 | Dec 2026 | Pending |
| At least one autonomous weapons incident will cause civilian casualties and trigger international investigation in 2026 | Feb 2026 | Dec 2026 | Pending |
We will evaluate these predictions publicly on December 31, 2026, and update this page accordingly. If we are wrong, we will say so clearly and analyze where our reasoning failed.
Predictor Track Records
Cumulative Accuracy (Evaluated Predictions Only)
| Predictor | Correct | Wrong | Partially Correct | Pending | Accuracy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stuart Russell | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 100% (small sample) |
| Timnit Gebru | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100% (small sample) |
| China analysts (composite) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 100% (small sample) |
| INHUMAIN.AI | 1 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 100% (small sample) |
| Gary Marcus | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | N/A (no clear correct/wrong) |
| Satya Nadella | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 50% (partial credit) |
| Elon Musk | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0% (evaluated only) |
| Sam Altman | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0% (evaluated only) |
| Tech industry lobbyists | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0% |
Context: Most predictions are still pending because they concern events in the 2027-2035 range. Accuracy percentages on small samples should be interpreted cautiously. What the data does show is a pattern: those who predict rapid AGI timelines have consistently been wrong, while those who predict specific harms from current systems have been more accurate.
What This Tells Us
Three patterns emerge from the scorecard:
1. AGI timelines are consistently overestimated by those with financial or reputational incentives to do so. Elon Musk, Sam Altman, and other figures with significant investments in AI companies have repeatedly predicted AGI timelines that have not materialized. This does not mean AGI is impossible or distant — it means that the people making the loudest claims have the least reliable track records.
2. Harm predictions are consistently underestimated by the same people. The individuals who are most optimistic about AGI timelines are often the same individuals who are most dismissive of current AI harms. The data shows the opposite pattern: specific harms are materializing faster than predicted, while AGI remains elusive.
3. Uncertainty is the honest position. The predictors with the best track records are those who express genuine uncertainty, provide wide ranges, or focus on specific near-term developments rather than sweeping timeline claims. Geoffrey Hinton’s “5-20 years” range is more honest than Elon Musk’s “by next year.”
For how these predictions relate to our risk assessment, see the AI Doomsday Clock.
This scorecard is updated quarterly. New predictions are added as they are made publicly. Evaluation status is updated as deadlines pass. Corrections and additional documented predictions can be submitted through our contact page.